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THE AUTHORITY OF VOICE*
RICHARD A. SHWEDER**

I. INTRODUCTION

These comments are inspired by my belief that in the postmodern
world, no mission can be important that is lacking in irony. The topic of
the conference, "lawyering," is somewhat new to me, but not the issues
it addresses or the intellectual trends it expresses.
Given the liberties extended to commentators, I am tempted on this

occasion to mention the variety of topics I enjoy talking about most. For
example, patriarchy or moral rhetoric. In recent years I have been

involved in research in India and the United States on moral discourse that

has turned up three different rhetorics for moral regulation.' One rhetoric
is a "rhetoric of autonomy," which focuses on such concepts as "harm,"
"rights," and "justice." 2 Those three concepts are very puffed up and
important in highly individualistic subcultures such as our own. A second
rhetoric is a "rhetoric of community," which focuses on such concepts as
"duty," "hierarchy," and "interdependency." 3 Unlike a "rhetoric of
autonomy," which stresses individual preference and discretionary choice,

a "rhetoric of community" focuses on obligations of station, position, and
role; its discourse and conceptual scheme stress the connection between
social and personal identity and the embeddedness of self within a larger
community or team. A third rhetoric is a "rhetoric of divinity," built up
out of concepts such as sanctity, purity, sin, natural order, and sacred
* @Copyright by Richard A. Shweder 1993 and Dazdalus: Journalof American

Academy of Arts and Sciences 1993. This article is based on the remarks the author
delivered as a commentator at the New York Law School Lawyering Theory Symposium,
Mar. 1992. It was later enlarged for an article titled "Why Do Men Barbecue?" and
Other PostmodernIronies ofGrowing Up in the Decade ofEthnicity, 122 D.DALUs 279
(1993). The excerpted material from the article is reprinted by permission of Ddalas:
Journalof American Academy ofArts and Sciences, from the issue entitled, America's
Childhood, Winter 1993, Vol. 122, No. 1.
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1. See Richard A. Shweder et al., The "Big Three" of Morality (Autonomy,
Community, Divinity), and the "Big Three" Explanations of Suffering, as well, in
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order.4 A "rhetoric of divinity" is a way of talking and thinking that
creates a sensitivity to one's self as a spiritual entity. It makes salient the
issue of dignity versus degradation. In rural India, the rhetoric of
community and divinity are highly elaborated.
But I am not going to discuss those topics today. Nor am I going to
talk about postmodernism in general or in the abstract, which would be
another temptation. For the moment, and in passing, I will simply allude
to postmodernism, in one particular and concrete way, by reference to the
notion of a "placebo placebo" effect. I do not mean the first-order
"placebo effect." It is rather the second-order "placebo placebo" effect
that captures the postmodem way of thinking.
The premodern mind has its own special view of therapy. There are
substances that have transcendental and magical powers associated with
powerful figures, like gods. You ingest those substances and you get
better. As you move into modem modes of thought-the stances of the
enlightenment-the "placebo effect" supersedes the magical substance.
Along with the "placebo effect" comes the idea of mind-body interaction
and a therapeutic process that is authoritarian and hegemonic. Wherever
you have a "placebo effect," someone has to deceive someone else and tell
them falsely that they are ingesting an active substance. The doctor,
somewhat corruptly, takes advantage of his or her authority over the
patient. The doctor lies.
Within the terms of a postmodemr mentality, typified by the secondorder "placebo placebo" effect, there is no place for false beliefs or
necessary illusions upheld by the authority of a professional elite. You say
to yourself: "I've got a headache; I think I'll take a placebo for it." You
go to your medicine chest where you have jars labeled "placebo for
headache," "placebo for stomach spasms," etc. You take one. You know
what it is, and it works. There exists such a form of consciousness, which
is why it is possible to revisit and revalue premodern practices and ideas
from a postmodem point of view, without having to "believe" or to work
out the logic of the case, or even to have "faith," in the modernist's sense.
You participate, you activate some aspect of our complex human nature,
and you benefit.
Yet another temptation, given the type of self-reflection about
"lawyering" that has gone on at this conference and our willingness to
play around with the infinite regress, is to talk about the idea of "going
meta." On my short list of favorite titles from journal articles is one which
reads, Anything You Can Do I Can Do Meta, which is an activity we
engage in a lot in the social sciences.
But, in reality, the only issue I am going to address here today
concerns the authority of voice, the authority to be a voice, and the quest
4. See Shweder et al., supranote 1; Shweder, supra note 1, at 2064.
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for alternative voices, whether gendered, racial, or national voices. In the
cross-cultural and anthropological circles in which I travel, this is
sometimes called the "internationalization of theory."
The irony begins with that idea. For in international arenas these days,
one quickly discovers that from the perspective of many third-world
intellectuals and scholars, to "internationalize theory" means to have
access to Western journals, institutions, and resources. It also means to
contribute authoritatively to the formation of precisely that social-science
theory in the West that many Western intellectuals and scholars in New
York, Boston, and Chicago view as ethnocentric. Yet from the perspective
of many first-world intellectuals and scholars, to "internationalize theory"
is to give "voice" to precisely those indigenous theories from the Third
World that many third-world intellectuals and scholars view as backward,
superstitious, archaic, and dangerously fundamentalist.
Indeed, at one recent meeting of men, women, and representatives of
majority and minority groups from various first- and third-world
countries, I found the indigenous voice of the Third World most often
voiced by a Westerner, while the voice of Western theory as often as not
came straight out of Africa or Japan. The effect of all that intellectual
place switching was to induce a sense of metaphysical jet lag across
genders, cultures, and continents and to open up a conversation about the
full range of interpretive possibilities for thinking about the significance
of "differences." Such phrases as "speaking as a woman," "speaking as
a man," or "speaking as a Westerner" took on a new meaning, which is
to say no definable meaning at all, as a multiplicity of perspectives
dissolved any unitary voice. Tongues kept getting twisted in the middle of
every pitch. The time seemed ripe for a heightening of our awareness of
the ironic nature of "difference" in this decade of etlnicity and selfconsciousness about group designations.
The essay that follows is informal and literary in style, which is one
way to be serious when taking a look at the sardonic face of the diversity
of intellectual and political viewpoints in the postmodem world. The usual
disclaimers apply. As I try to give character to the problem of diversity
and the voice of irony, I will be advocating a position which might be
described as postmodern humanism or "universalism without the
uniformity." Because it is no longer possible these days for any one
person to speak with a single voice, I cannot pretend to speak for
everyone else, for anyone else or even for all sides of my self. The best
I can do is try to speak for one kind of citizen in our ethnically selfconcious world.

II. THE POSTMODERN SCENE: SANTA CLAus NAILED TO A CROSS
Perhaps there was a time in the mythic past when the anthropological
"other" was pristine, unitary, alien, and lived very far away. If so, things
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have changed. In the postmodern world that commerce has helped to
create, the anthropological "other" is sophisticated, multiplex, near at
hand, and deeply embedded in- the bureaucratic institutions of the world
system. Anthropology is no longer the discipline that adduces good
reasons for the customs of others, which they cannot adduce for
themselves. United Airlines, CNN, a Visa card, and Western perspectives
have usually gotten there first, or are soon to arrive, and encounters
between cultures over questions of "authority," "voice," and "paradigm
comparisons" more often than not have the feel of a segment from the
Monty Python show.
A few years ago, for example, I heard a story from Clifford Geertz'
about a visitor to Japan who wandered into a department store in Tokyo,
at a time when the Japanese had begun to take a great interest in the
symbolism of the Christmas season. And what symbol of the Christmas
season did the visitor discover prominently on display in the Tokyo
department store? Santa Claus nailed to a cross!
When I first heard that story, I opened a "Santa Claus nailed to a
cross" file, which has grown over the years. Some people think that in the
postmodern world words have no reference or validity and you can never
know quite what you are talking about. When I look at my file, I feel
reassured that in our postmodern world truth is still stranger than fiction,
even as it has become more difficult to pin things down. Here are some
other entries from the file.
There is an entry about a South Asian Indian woman, married to an
American, who applied for US citizenship so that her father who had lived
all his life in the Third World could join the American Peace Corps. At
the final stage of being "naturalized" in New York, the immigration
officer said to her, "Do you swear that you will bear arms in defense of
the Constitution of the United States?" Compounding the irony of her
situation she replied, "No, I won't do that." He asked, "What do you
mean?" She said, "I am a pacifist. I don't believe in killing." He said,
"Who taught you that?" She said, "Mahatma Gandhi." He said, "Who is
he?" She said, "A great Indian religious leader." He said, "Well, you will
have to get a note from him." She said, "I can't, he is dead." He said,
"Well, get a note from whoever took his place."
There is a parallel entry in my file about an American scholar trained
as a "symbolic anthropologist" who sought official research permission to
do work among the Maori people of New Zealand. As part of the official
procedure he found himself interrogated by a "native," a Maori with an
Oxford Ph.D. in anthropology, who was a gatekeeper for the tribe and
5. Clifford Geertz is a faculty member at the Institute For Advanced Study in
Princeton, New Jersey, and a leading United States anthropologist specializing in
Indonesia.
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who had some doubts about the "Chicago school" of symbolism as a way
to represent the beliefs and practices of "others."
There is an entry in my file about a prominent member of an East
African tribe, a professional philosopher, who had an interest in reviving
traditional practices. As it turned out, the old ways and customs had been
discarded and forgotten even by the elders of his tribe. The main
repository of knowledge about the past was located in ethnographies
published in Europe and the United States. He realized he needed a
Western anthropologist as a consultant. He had no difficulty finding
someone to take the job.
There is an entry about the origin of the English word "juggernaut,"
which is used in the Anglo-American world to mean "a massive
inexorable force or object that crushes anything that is in its path." It just
so happens that Juggernaut lives in a temple in the town of Puri on the
East Coast of India about 40 miles from where I do anthropological
fieldwork. He is in fact a beneficent god, the ninth reincarnation of the
Hindu god Vishnu, the protector of the universe. Once a year Juggernaut
gets sick, recovers from his illness, and then goes on a vacation to visit
his maternal aunt at her temple a mile or so down the road. A huge
chariot is built for the occasion (in fact three chariots because he is
accompanied by his sister and half-brother)., Hundreds of thousands of
pilgrims come to Puri on the designated day in June or July to pull the
chariots and gain religious merit. It is a wild topsy-turvy event, full of
jest, complaint, and celebration in which all caste boundaries are relaxed
and everyone is equal before god. Occasionally in the tumult someone is
injured (and in the past perhaps even killed) under the wheels of the
chariots. When, during colonial rule, the British first witnessed the event,
they mistook it for a human sacrifice. Hence the image, now enshrined in
the English language, of a vicious yet irresistible force crushing things in
its wake. Sometimes when one gazes from a distance through ethnocentric
lenses across ethnic fault lines things can seem quite the opposite from
what they are.
There is an entry in my file about the organizers of a cultural festival
in Los Angeles, who lost funding from the Korean government when they
decided to "represent" Korea with a performance by indigenous shamans
rather than with the ballet company proposed by the Korean government.
The Thai community of Los Angeles was also offended because the
festival featured a classical dance troupe from Cambodia but only popular
street theater from Thailand.6 The distinction between high and low,
primitive and modem is not peculiar to the West. It seems that these days
it is largely in the West that people get nervous when the idea of a
6. See J.L. HANNA, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, ISSUES IN SUPPORTING SCHOOL
DIVERSrrY: ACADEMICS SOCIAL RELATIONS AND THE ARTS (1991).
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hierarchy of taste and value is invoked. We prefer to talk about "popular"
culture.
There is an entry about all those incredible ethnographic accounts
from New Guinea, where in the highlands the men avoid women, and in
the lowlands young men inseminate each other in homosexual rites, and
here and there married men, loathing the pollution of the sexual act,
induce themselves to vomit or bleed their noses after making love to their
wives and before returning to the men's hut. Such accounts have had
prominence in the lore of anthropology, yet, after a few years of contact
with the West, almost everything that was exotic about New Guinea seems
to have disappeared. Anthropologists go back to their field sites to
discover that no one knows the name for plants anymore or cares very
much for the old rituals. Everyone is going to school so that they can have
access to jobs, manufactured goods, and T-shirts from the "Hard Rock
Cafe." The sexual symbolism and avoidance customs of the culture
seemed very deep indeed, until they just went away.
There is an entry in my file drawn from a New York 7imes review'
of Bill Moyers' program The Arab World, 8 which the reviewer, Walter
Goodman, describes as "a benign attempt to counter the stereotype of the
ugly Arab that has been circulating in recent years." 9 Various scholars of,
and spokespersons for, the Middle East argue that apparent emblems of
oppression (for example, the female head scarf) are merely a matter of
style, that Christianity and Islam share the same fundamental ideals, and
that the Arab world is on the road to democracy and social justice. The
reviewer notes that ". . . Mr. Moyers seems glad to hear the good
news"' ° and that the effect of the program "is as intellectually stimulating
as one of those 'we're all different but we're all the same' celebrations in
junior high school. " "
And there are many personal entries. In 1982, for example, I was
living in what I thought was a relatively remote district of India when
television first landed. It immediately became a dowry item in arranged
marriages and a basic necessity demanded by women in purdah. I was
invited to watch the unveiling of a television set in a traditional household.
What was the first image to appear on the tube? An old segment from "I
Love Lucy." Lucy was out on a blind date with a duck hunter. I was
asked to explain.
7. Walter Goodman, "Arab World" Attempt to CounterStereotypes, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 8, 1991, at C14.
8. The Arab World (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8-12, 1991).
9. Goodman, supra note 6, at C14.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Some time later I was in Manhattan watching cable television with a
parochial "Westerner." As I flipped stations what did I discover? News
from New Delhi and a segment from the Hindu epic, The Ramayana. I
was asked to explain. I flipped channels again. There was a Japanese soap
opera, heavily scripted with facial displays of shyness, embarrassment,
and self-effacing apologetic dialogue ("I am sorry for dominating our
children," and "I am sorry for this and especially sorry for that."). With
"public access" to our living rooms, there is more and more to explain,
and it is less and less clear how to take a stand on questions of fact and
value without seeming hegemonic, dogmatic or prejudiced. It is less and
less clear whether prejudgment is always such a bad thing.
My friend, the literary critic, Anatole Broyard 2 used to tell his
writing students, "Hang on to your prejudices, they are the only taste you
have got." Almost everyone in the academy these days has heard of the
continental dictum that it is our prejudices that makes it possible for us to
see, which means that in thinking, as in-life, if you do not fix a starting
point you'll never get started. Broyard, who sensed our postmodern
predicament and knew how to express it with grace and wit, formulated
the aphorism this way: "Paranoids are the only ones who notice things
anymore."13 Nietzsche-like he understood that any prejudice is better
than no prejudice at all, and that in a postmodern world of cable television
and metaphysical jet lag, the best one can do is stay on the move, keeping
your options for prejudice open while developing some sensibility or at
least some good sense.
Unfortunately too many have misunderstood such, exciting
deconstructive insights. They have drawn the conclusion that the authority
of a voice or viewpoint has little to do with what is said and everything
to do with who says it. They have overlooked the fact that you do not
have to be a Westerner or a male to articulate a Western or masculine
perspective, and that most Westerners and most males are not very good
at it anyhow. Authoritative voices, one is tempted to say, speak for the
muse, and you know such voices speak for the muse not because of who
they are, least of all their social designation, but because what they say
binds you to a reality.
Now obviously, it is desirable to encourage counter-voices and
subaltern views, which are corrosive of the dogma that is the unavoidable
concomitant or inherent side-effect of "taking a stand." One ought to stay
on the move. I have long been impressed by the fact that the human retina
is moving all the time, even though those who gaze through a retina are
12. Anatole Broyard was a long-time book critic, book-review editor and an essayist
for the New York Tiunes. See Fitzhugh Mullan, Chronicleof a Death Foretold, WASH.

POST, May 10, 1992, at X9.
13. Anatole Broyard, Personal Communication.

258

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

unaware that their retina moves. These are the "saccadic movements,"
very rapid, even if unnoticed, motions of the human eye. If you fixate the
retina, the visual field disappears; the perceived world breaks up and you
cannot see.
So you have to stay on the move to see. This is one of the reasons the
cobra sways. Cobras happen to have a fixed retina. No saccadic
movements. The only way they can see is by swaying. So if you ever run
into a cobra, just sway with it and it won't bite you, because it won't
know you are there.
Of course, special problems may arise in the study of "lawyering,"
which do not arise in the study of "sciencing," "philosophizing," or
"internationalizing theory." Other things are at stake in legal settings
besides simply binding you to a reality. A higher-order goal seems to be
operating, which is to bind judges or juries to a reality such that someone
gets nailed or someone gets off the hook. I suspect that is why casuistry
got a bad name long ago, and it is probably why lawyers do not go to
heaven. Whether those who are busy at work constructing or inventing
"lawyering" go to heaven still remains to be seen.

